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On What There “Is”: Aristotle and the 
Aztecs on Being and Existence 
L. Sebastian Purcell
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT CORTLAND
1. WHAT “IS” THERE? 
A curious feature of Aztec philosophy is that the basic
metaphysical question of the “Western” tradition cannot be
formulated in their language, in Nahuatl. Aristotle, writing
on what he variously called first philosophy, wisdom, and
theology, formulates its subject matter thus: “There is a
science [epistēmē] which investigates being qua being
[to on hē on] and what pertains to it when considered in
its own right.”1 What we now call metaphysics or ontology,
then, is concerned with being just insofar as it is. W.V.O.
Quine, writing more than two millennia later, expresses the
same broad concern. He writes that the basic problem of
ontology “can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables:
‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word— 
’Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true.”2 
The difficulty in the case of the Aztecs is that Nahuatl has 
no word for “being” or “to be.” As a result, there is no way 
to formulate the question, “What is there?” or to claim that 
the aim of first philosophy is to understand “being qua
being.” This point does not suggest that the Nahuas were 
unconcerned with metaphysics, or that even the traditional 
“Western” metaphysical question could not be expressed 
(imperfectly) through circumlocution in their language. 
Rather, it suggests the grounds for why the Nahuas, the 
pre-Columbian people who spoke Nahuatl in Mesoamerica, 
approached this question so differently. 
The present essay thus argues for three closely related 
points: first, that the Nahuas may be understood to provide 
an answer to the fundamental character of reality, one which 
served to give content to the meaning of “wisdom” just 
as one finds in Aristotle; second, that their conception of 
reality consists in a conceptual couplet teot and ometeotl, 
which view rivals Aristotle’s substance (ousia); and, third, 
that the Nahua answer is prima facie reasonable. To explain, 
a little, the significance of these claims and the motivation 
for the comparison with Aristotle, one might consider the 
following points. 
Aristotle’s metaphysics is a paradigm case of substance 
ontology, that is, the view which holds that the answer 
to the basic question of metaphysics “What is there?” 
is substance (ousia). He thinks this is a good answer, 
moreover, because it satisfies some apparently reasonable 
desiderata any account should provide. In the first place, 
we would like to know that the answer can explain what 
the basic subjects of the universe are, those in which other 
properties inhere, and those beyond which analysis is no 
longer meaningful. In the second, we would like the answer 
to explain what something is, and not simply how it is, or 
why it is. Intuitively, we sense that we know something 
when we know its “what.” Substance, Aristotle argues, 
satisfies both these criteria. 
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The Nahuas’ outlook may instead be taken as a paradigm 
case of process metaphysics, that is, a view which answers 
the basic question of metaphysics by holding that reality at 
base is a “process” in a sense to be described below. This 
view may be distinguished from the substance approach 
because it rejects not only the formulation of the basic 
question for metaphysics, since there is no “is” for the 
Nahuas, but also the desiderata which Aristotle thinks any 
good account should satisfy. 
The comparison proposed is thus of interest for several 
reasons. A first concerns its consequence for the discipline 
of metaphysics itself. The Nahua view challenges the basic 
presuppositions of the ontological tradition in “Western” 
philosophy, whether that formulation is Aristotle’s, or 
Quine’s.3 The view proposed is also rather different from 
the handful of self-consciously styled process-based 
metaphysical accounts in the “West.”4 It matters, then, 
whether such a view is at least prima facie coherent. If one 
cannot use the word “being” to answer the basic question 
of metaphysics, after all, just what is it that is left over, and 
why would it make sense? 
It is also of interest to indigenous, Nahua philosophy to 
clarify just what is intended by their “process” metaphysics. 
Others have claimed that their metaphysics is “relational” 
or “process” based, but of course Aristotle could make 
sense of relations and process.5 In some reasonable sense, 
the what of something, its to ti esti, just is what it does.6 So 
it is unclear, if one uses only these terms, just in what way 
Aristotle and the Nahua outlooks are to be distinguished. 
Finally, with respect to philosophers of classical Hellenic 
antiquity, the inquiry matters because it presents at least 
one new direction of study. The major scholarly controversy 
in the Metaphysics, for example, concerns just how to make 
sense of Aristotle’s claim in book VII.13 that no universal 
is a substance, when he appears to have been arguing, 
up to this point, both that substance is form, and form is 
universal.7 Yet perhaps Aristotle has arrived at this position 
because the desiderata outlined previously are themselves 
problematic—this is, at least, an open question—and 
this would bear on all the further notions which Aristotle 
develops, including form and matter, potency and activity, 
and universality and particularity. In this way, comparative 
philosophy may help to raise new avenues for study in 
Hellenistic inquiry. 
As the first comparative essay on this topic in any modern 
language, the discussion faces a few initial hurdles that 
might not otherwise exist. To avoid them, it proves easiest 
to begin with the way in which epistemic claims are related 
to metaphysical ones in the thought of both Aristotle 
and the Nahuas. The next sections, §§2-3, thus look to 
distinguish a variety of forms of knowledge, including 
knowledge by acquaintance, know-how, experience, 
practical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom. The argument 
matches the sorts of appeal that Aristotle makes in book 
I of the Metaphysics with the accounts provided about 
Nahua philosophers themselves. An important difference 
that emerges is that the Nahuas had no notion comparable 
to Aristotle’s epistēmē. In one respect, this is unsurprising, 
because Aristotle’s notion itself is quite specific to his 
philosophical outlook and not shared, even, with Plato. 
In another, there is a larger philosophic reason why the 
Nahuas had no similar notion, namely, because they were 
not metaphysically realist in their outlook. 
To explain what might be called their quasi-realism, the 
argument moves, in §§4-6, to the content of theoretical 
wisdom for Aristotle and the Nahuas, namely, ousia and 
(ome)teotl, respectively. The claim in this case is that teotl
is the best answer to the question (posed in English), “What 
is there?” but that teotl is always expressed under a certain 
cosmological configuration as ometeotl. The cosmological 
configuration is what the Nahuas metaphorically call a 
“sun,” and they hold that our cosmos exists in the fifth sun 
(explained below). The formula that thus emerges is that 
teotl only exists qua some sun as ometeotl, and ometeotl
qua the fifth sun is our cosmos. Since it is thought that this 
fifth sun too will pass into another configuration, it is not 
possible to have eternal knowledge, much less scientific 
knowledge (the sort expressed by Aristotle’s epistēmē) of 
teotl. The best that can be done is to provide more beautiful 
metaphors of this notion, i.e., teotl, which may explain why 
the Nahuas’ highest metaphysical literature is expressed 
poetically and not in treatise form. Moreover, since only 
a provisional account of reality as ometeotl is possible, 
the Nahua metaphysical outlook is best thought to be a 
sort of quasi-realism. The argument concludes with further 
avenues for research. 
2. WISDOM: SOPHIA 
Aristotle begins Metaphysics I.1 with something that he takes 
will be readily accepted, “[a]ll humans naturally desire to 
know” (Met. I.1, 980a20).8 He proceeds dialectically, teasing 
through ways of knowing until he reaches wisdom (sophia). 
The line of reasoning runs as follows. A sign of our desire to 
know is our preference for the sense of sight, which enables 
us to know the look of things quickly.9 Animals too have 
faculties of sensation, but some among them also have 
memory, which enables them to learn. What they mostly 
lack, however, is connected experience (empeiria). Still, 
this sort of knowledge (to eidenai) is limited to individual 
matters. For humans, memory forms experience, and when 
this experience gives rise to many notable observations 
and a single universal judgment is formed concerning 
them, one has an art (technē). While experience may thus 
lead to effective action and production just as well as art, 
since actions and productions concern individual affairs, 
knowledge and understanding (to epaiein) properly belong 
to art. For the one who possesses an art knows the cause, 
the why, while the person of experience does not. The 
object of study for science (epistēmē), unlike art, cannot be 
other than it is, and so exists of necessity and is eternal.10 
Science does not, moreover, aim at production while art is 
just this disposition to produce something which may or 
may not be (NE VI.4, 1140a20-25). 
Two conclusions follow from these reflections. First, they 
explain why we do not regard any of the senses to provide 
wisdom, for while they give knowledge of particulars, “they 
do not tell us the ‘why’ of anything” (Met. I.1, 980b11-12).11 
Second, they explain why “all people suppose that what is 
called wisdom concerns the first causes [ta prōta aitia] and 
the principles [ta archas] of things” (Met. I.1, 980b28-29).12 
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For while art can explain the why, or cause, of a production 
or action, it cannot explain the why for what is eternal and 
could not be otherwise. Yet wisdom is thought most to 
consist in just this latter sort of topic. 
To get a better sense of which science yields wisdom, 
Aristotle changes his approach in Metaphysics I.2. Rather 
than simply consider what is commonly accepted, he 
considers the wise person (ho sophos), as commonly 
understood, and develops five criteria from this reflection 
that any science would have to satisfy to yield wisdom. This 
person (1) knows all things, (2) knows what is most difficult, 
(3) knows the exact causes and is able to teach them, (4) 
knows what is complete, or desirable on its own account 
and not for something else, and, finally, (5) knows what is 
most authoritative, giving instruction to other branches and 
people (Met. I.2, 982a8-19). 
What these criteria suggest is that the science which yields 
wisdom ought at least to have these qualities. This means 
that the science desired must (1) give knowledge of what 
is universal, which is also (2) the hardest to know since 
it is furthest from the senses; (3) give knowledge of first 
principles, which are most exact and which are teachable 
because they explain the why; (4) give knowledge of what 
is most knowable and not know for the sake of another 
subject, which is what the first principles do; and, finally, 
(5) give knowledge that specifies the end for each thing 
to be done, and in this way is most authoritative. This last 
point suggests especially that the science in question is 
one, rather than multiple sciences, so that the same name 
applies to each of the desiderata (Met. I.2, 982a24-b10). 
What Aristotle leaves unresolved at this point is just what 
that name is, and he instead considers what would not 
satisfy the inquiry, including productive arts and proposals 
by other historical figures. 
3. WISDOM: TLAMATILIZTLI 
What is interesting about the Nahua approach to wisdom is 
that it too worked to distinguish wisdom from other sorts 
of knowledge. There are, broadly, four sorts of knowledge 
at work in the Nahua understanding: tlamatiliztli, wisdom; 
ixtlamatiliztli, connected experience or prudence; 
toltecayotl, artisanal knowledge; and the sort of magical 
knowledge that a nahual (shaman) was thought to possess. 
Finally, one should note that the basic word from which 
many of these terms are derived is mati, which means 
both to know epistemically (savoir, saber) and to know by 
acquaintance (connaître, conocer).13 
Some of the descriptions of various knowledge-workers 
from the Florentine Codex provide sound evidence for 
these distinctions. The description of the craftsman, 
toltecatl, reads in part as follows: 
The craftsman [toltecatl] is well instructed 
[tlamachtilli], an artisan. There were many of 
them. The good craftsman is able, discreet, 
prudent [mimati], resourceful, retentive. The good 
craftsman is a willing worker, patient, calm. He 
works with care, he makes works of skill [toltecati]; 
he constructs, prepares, arranges, orders, fits, 
matches [materials]. (FC 10, 25) 
One observes in this passage that the toltecatl is one who is 
learned, “mach-” is the base 4 stem of mati used in passive 
constructions, in various matters (tla-). His14 knowledge 
is a sort of prudence, mimati (more below), but it is also 
primarily focused on know-how. In fact, the term toltecati is 
later best translated as “skill.” 
The philosopher tlamatini, by contrast, is the one who 
possesses tlamatiliztli (wisdom), but who, among the 
people described in the FC, does not possess toltecayotl, 
artisanal knowledge.15 The relevant portion for the 
description reads as follows: 
The good philosopher is a knowledgeable 
physician, a person of trust, a teacher worthy of 
confidence and faith. [He is] a teacher [temachtiani] 
and adviser, a counselor [teixtlamachtiani] who 
helps one assume a face [teixcuitiani, teixtomani]; 
one who informs one’s ears [tenacaztlapoani]. [He] 
is one who casts light on another; who is a guide 
who accompanies one (FC 10, 29).16 
This description largely highlights the role of the 
philosopher as a counselor (te-ixtlamachtia-ni), which was 
a bit like Socrates’s role as the gadfly of Athens, and this 
is identified as (part of) his know-how (ixtlamatiliztli).17 In 
this capacity the philosopher is one whom one sought out 
for consultation. And the specific goal of the philosopher 
was to aid the counseled in “assuming a face.” Two highly 
compounded terms, te-ix-cui-tia-ni and te-ix-to-ma-ni, 
appear juxtaposed. The construction indicates that they are 
intended to express a single thought. The initial ‘te’ in both 
cases means that the action is performed for an indefinite 
person, for someone else, while the ‘ix’ is the stem of ixtli, 
meaning “face” in the most literal sense. Yet the term is 
widely used in its more metaphorical sense to indicate 
an aspect of one’s psyche, namely, the seat of one’s 
judgment. Finally, the root concept of both words (cui and 
ana) means “to take.” As a result, the idea expressed is that 
the philosopher helps another person (te) take or assume 
(cui, ana) a “face” (ixtli), i.e., a basis for sound judgment. 
The philosopher thus has a certain sort of ixtlamatiliztli, but it 
is not of the same quality as that of the toltecatl, the artisan. 
The latter has ixtlamatiliztli in the sense that he knows just 
how to execute his craft, how to work with gold, or arrange 
quetzal plumes in headdresses. In the philosopher’s case, 
ixtlamatiliztli consists in being able to act as a guide for the 
counseled, to lay out a path for one’s life, and to serve as 
a mirror to clarify one’s reflections. His ixtlamatiliztli thus 
consists in knowing how to lead a good life, and knowing 
how to enable others to do the same. It is thus much closer 
to Aristotle’s phronēsis than the toltecatl’s craftsmanship. 
Finally, the philosopher’s knowledge is distinct from the 
knowledge that other wise men receive. Specifically, the 
soothsayer (tlapouhqui), who made predictions based on 
the day signs, and the shaman or sorcerer (noaoalli) are 
also described as tlamatinime of a sort. The description of 
the sorcerer, for example, begins as follows: “The sorcerer 
is a wise man [in naoalli tlamatini], a counselor, a person of 
trust” (FC 31). Similarly, the soothsayer’s description begins, 
“The soothsayer is a wise man [in tlapouqui ca tlamatini], an 
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owner of books and writings” (FC 31). The term tlamatini, 
then, is generally used for wise persons of various sorts and 
not only philosophers. But the descriptions distinguish just 
in what their wisdom was thought to consist. The sorcerer’s 
knowledge involves enchantment, and the soothsayer’s 
wisdom is limited to counting or reading (pouh) the day 
sign calendar (tonalamatl). While it is possible that a single 
person could have served in all three roles, then, the 
Nahuas took care to distinguish among the sorts of wise 
men by the sort of knowledge that they had and would 
have recognized the differences among those roles. 
How is it, then, that the philosopher has this sort of 
knowledge, has the ixtlamatiliztli which is essential to her 
tlamatiliztli? The answer, in part, is that she will have had 
enough life experiences to know how to counsel in specific 
ways. As Aristotle would have said, she has been brought 
up well and lived well. Yet, she also knows because the 
philosopher, tla-mati-ni, also has wisdom, tla-mati-liztli, the 
term most directly connected with her name, concerning 
the most important matters. This is to say, she knows 
because the philosopher knows about the character of 
reality, i.e., the way things are through their changes.18 What 
follows is an example that illustrates how philosophers, in 
this case Nezahualcoyotl, were preoccupied with the most 
fundamental way things are. He writes: 
Are you real, rooted [toteycneliya]? 
Is it only as to come inebriated? 
The Giver of Life, is this true [nelli]? 
Perhaps, as they say, it is not true? 
May our hearts be not tormented! 
All that is real, that is rooted, 
they say that it is not real, not rooted. 
The Giver of Life only appears [omonenequin] 
absolute. 
May our hearts be not tormented, 
because he is the Giver of Life.19 
The passage shows Nezahualcoyotl’s doubts and desires to 
understand the fundamental character of reality. He gives it 
various names. Here it is the Giver of Life (ipalnemohuani), 
but in others, including the song recorded just above in 
the codex, it is he who is self-caused (moyocoya). It is by 
understanding this principle and its relation to our lives, its 
balanced harmony, that the Nezahualcoyotl hopes to avoid 
a “tormented” heart. 
Like Aristotle, then, the Nahuas distinguished among sorts 
of knowledge, and a comparison is summarized as follows: 
knowledge by acquaintance aisthesis mati 
connected experience empeiria ixtlamatiliztli 
prudence phronēsis ixtlamatiliztli 
artisanal knowledge technē toltecayotl 
science epistēmē 
wisdom sophia tlamatiliztli 
One notes first that Aristotle and the Nahua philosophers 
share many roughly similar terms for epistemic matters. 
Yet, second, and crucially, the Nahua philosophers had 
no corresponding term for epistēmē, which defines both 
Aristotle’s specific objective of inquiry in the Metaphysics, 
and the character of sophia as he understands it. The reason 
for this is that sophia is a sort of epistēmē about first causes. 
Finally, Aristotle holds that epistēmē can be had of matters 
that are eternally true, so that sophia also concerns eternal 
truths, while the Nahuas did not think such knowledge was 
possible, so that tlamatiliztli only concerns the best or most 
important truths.20 
While both Aristotle and the Nahuas thus conceived of 
philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom (tlamatiliztli), where 
this wisdom consists in understanding the fundamental 
principles of what is real or true (nelli), they still thought 
of the matter differently. Aristotle’s sense of philosophy is 
methodical, one which uses logical proof and, where this 
is not suitable, dialectical reasoning. His understanding 
of science, moreover, is a body of knowledge that seeks 
the eternally true. The Nahuas did not have a similar 
methodological focus, and this is tied to their sense that 
the character of reality as it is given to us is not eternal. 
Wisdom for them consists of the best sort of knowledge, 
but what makes it best is not that it is guaranteed by the 
seal of eternity. This point explains, moreover, why poetry 
would be more apt to express this wisdom than logical 
argument on the Nahuas’ conception. 
The differences between Aristotle and the Nahuas on 
wisdom thus turn in large part about the fundamental 
character of reality which they sought to investigate, so it is 
just to this topic which the argument now turns, beginning 
with Aristotle’s account in the Metaphysics. 
4. WHAT THERE “IS”: OUSIA 
In book III of the Metaphysics, Aristotle develops a series of 
puzzles concerning the possibility of the universal science 
desired in book I. He writes: 
We must, with a view to the science which we are 
seeking, first recount the subjects that should 
be first discussed. These include both the other 
opinions that some have held on certain points, 
and any points besides these that happen to have 
been overlooked. (Met. III.1, 995a24-7) 
The statement is important, since it shows that Aristotle is 
still in search of this science and that having it is desirable. It 
also introduces the series of puzzles that follow. In a broad 
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way, these puzzles may be classed as (1) those concerning 
the possibility of this science, i.e., puzzles about this 
science, and (2) those concerning its character, i.e., puzzles 
for the science, such as those concerning substance, form, 
matter, and so on. It is possible to understand book IV as 
a response to the former puzzles about the science, while 
book VII, with special supplementation from books VIII, IX, 
and XII as a response to the latter questions. 
The central puzzles about the universal science which 
Aristotle raises in book III, at least for present purposes, 
may be understood as a sort of dilemma. If the universal 
science studies causes, then it would appear to conflict 
with the special sciences, which also study causes (Met. 
III.2, 996a18-b1). Yet, if it studies substance, then at least 
two problems may be thought to follow. First, the science 
would not appear to qualify as the sort that studies first 
axioms, since it would need to take the truth of those axioms 
for granted as other sciences do (Met. III.2, 996b33-997a5). 
Second, it is difficult to understand how there could be a 
science of substances as such, since this science would 
have to discuss essence as well—a substance, in part, 
explains the what, or essence (to ti esti), of something. 
Yet, “there seems to be no demonstration of the essence 
[tou ti estin]” (Met. III.2, 997a31-2).21 The universal science, 
as a result, would appear to take for granted what it was 
supposed to study. 
To address the puzzles about the desired science, Aristotle 
begins book IV with a new approach; it is that the universal 
science ought to be that which seeks to understand being 
qua being. 
There is some science [episteme] which 
investigates being qua being and the attributes 
which belong to it in itself [kath’ auto]. Now this 
is not the same as any of the so-called special 
sciences; for none of these others deals generally 
with being qua being. They cut off a part of being 
and investigate the attributes of this part—this is 
what the mathematical sciences do for instance. 
Now since we are seeking the first principles 
and the highest causes, clearly there must be 
something to which these belong in themselves. 
(Met. IV.1, 1003a21-28)22 
The approach is intended to avoid immediately falling into 
the pitfalls identified in book III. Adding “qua being” helps, 
because it shows why it is that this science does not study 
the same causes as the special sciences. They cut off a 
piece of being, but this science does not. Additionally, 
this approach suggests that the science studies what is 
truly universal, what any being must be, and so does not 
presuppose a set of axioms in the worried way.23 Finally, 
this science does study essential properties of being, not 
those which are incidental, and so it does explain the what 
(to ti esti) of an entity. 
Yet something additional emerges from Aristotle’s new 
approach, namely, a set of conditions for what this science 
must be. He begins IV.2 by recalling that there are many 
senses in which a thing may be said to be. Yet they are not 
homonymous, but are all rather related to a central term. 
The term “to be” functions just as “health” does. Yet as the 
various forms of “health” are all studied by one science, 
because there is a basic and central meaning, so too it 
would follow that all the senses of “being” are studied 
by one science, because it too has one central and basic 
meaning. He concludes: 
It is clear then that it is the work of one science to 
study beings [ta onta] qua being.—But everywhere 
science deals with that which is basic [kuriōs], 
and on which the other things depend, and on 
account of which they get their names. And so if 
this is substance [hē ousia], then it is of substances 
[tōn ousiōn] that the philosopher must have the 
principles and the causes. (Met. IV.2, 1003b15­
19)24 
In addition to concluding that the science of being qua
being is one, then, Aristotle also concludes that it must 
study that which is basic, and that this basic topic might 
turn out to be substance, hē ousia. As he develops the 
argument, however, he adds a second condition which 
substance must satisfy if it is to be the subject matter of 
the science of being qua being. 
If, now, being and unity are the same and are 
one thing in the sense that they are implied in 
one another as principle and cause are . . . and if, 
further, the substance [hē ousia] of each thing is 
one in no mere accidental way, but with respect to 
the very what a being is [kai hoper on ti]—all this 
being so, there must be exactly as many species of 
being as of unity. And to investigate the essence 
[to ti esti] of these is the work of a science [tēs 
epistēmēs] which is generically one. (Met. VI.2, 
1003b23-35)25 
Aristotle’s argument in this case is a little unclear, given 
the number of antecedents he uses before stating the 
consequent of the sentence. Yet his central point is that 
insofar as each being is one, in no mere accidental way, it 
is a what, an essence. And in making this case, moreover, 
he identifies hē ousia with the essence, the very what 
of a being, thus marking out a second condition which 
substance must satisfy if it is to qualify as the subject 
matter for the science of being qua being. 
Collecting these points with the surrounding ones Aristotle 
addresses in the section, the following thesis emerges. If 
there is a science of being qua being, then it would be a 
single science with parts. The first among these parts is 
the study of ousia, substance, since the other parts would 
presuppose it. Moreover, since this is the proper topic for 
philosophy, the study of being qua being pursued in this 
way is first philosophy. Yet in order to supply the antecedent 
to this conditional claim, one must show that ousia both is 
the basic subject of intelligibility, and that ousia identifies 
the what or essence of a being. One must identify the basic 
subject, because otherwise one would not have reached 
the topic of first philosophy, and one must identify the 
essence, because otherwise the notion would not enjoy 
explanatory priority.26 
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At the end of book VII.1, Aristotle claims to have completed 
the argument left unfinished at the end of book IV. He 
writes: 
And indeed the question which, both now and 
of old, has always been raised and always been 
the subject of doubt, namely “what is being [ti to 
on]?,” is just this question, “what is substance [tis
hē ousia]?” (Met. VII.1, 1028b2-4)27 
In short, the question which the pre-Socratic philosophers 
had asked, and for which they offered answers which 
included fire and water, has been answered instead with 
ousia. Yet in order for Aristotle to be satisfied with his 
answer, he needs to have shown that ousia is the primary 
subject and that it is an essence. How does he do that? 
With respect to the first topic, his argument is that the doctrine
of the categories, discussed earlier, shows that substance
is primary because it retains the right sort of asymmetrical
relation with the other categories: they depend on it. This is
the case because the others are not self-subsistent, capable
of being separated, and substance is that which underlies
them. “Clearly then,” Aristotle concludes, “it is in virtue
of this category that each of the others is. Therefore, that
which is primarily and is simply (not is something) must be
substance” (Met. VII.1, 1028a29-31). 
To show that substance is an essence, that it explains the 
what of a being, Aristotle argues that substance retains 
explanatory priority with respect to the other categories 
in three ways: in time, formula, and order of knowledge 
(Met. VII.1, 1028a31). Temporally, one must recall that 
only substance exists independently. With respect to the 
formula [logō] of each term, substance must be present to 
complete the definition. Finally, he provides two arguments 
for the order of knowledge. At the beginning of the section, 
he argues from our linguistic use: 
While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that 
which is primary is the ‘what,’ which indicates 
the substance of a thing. For when we say of 
what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or 
beautiful, but not that it is three cubits long or that 
it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not 
say ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long,’ but ‘man’ 
or ‘God’. (Met. VII.1, 1028a13-18) 
The argument here, then, is that we speak in such a way 
that we treat the what of something as its substance, but 
this may only be a manner of speaking. This is why, at the 
end of the section, he also highlights what might be called 
a phenomenological argument: we experience a sense 
of knowing something when we know its substance: “we 
think we know each thing most fully when we know what 
it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we 
know its quality, or its quantity, or where it is” (Met. VII.1, 
1028a36-b1). 
The progression of argument in the Metaphysics thus 
moves from a statement about the subject matter of sophia 
(wisdom) as the epistēmē (science) of being qua being, to 
an articulation of its first principle as ousia (substance), to 
the basic criteria which an account of ousia must satisfy, 
namely, that it should identify both the basic subject of an 
entity and its what, or essence (to ti esti). Finally, in book VII 
Aristotle shows that ousia does satisfy these requirements, 
only to introduce the problematic relation of form and 
matter with their related notions, which will occupy him 
through books VIII, IX, and XII. Since the Nahuas conceive 
of wisdom rather differently, it is unsurprising that they 
should also understand the fundamental character of 
reality differently. 
5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF OMNIPREDICATIVITY 
Like Aristotle, the Nahua philosophers also sought to 
understand the basic character of reality. Yet the answer 
they proposed was not a form of being, suitably abstracted. 
One reason for this is that they had no word for “being” 
available to them. Considered semantically, the closest 
available term is câ, which means to be in some place or 
in some way. Nahuatl has several ways to abstract terms, 
so that it might have been possible to speak of ca-yotl
as roughly equivalent to hē ousia, or ca-ti-liztli as close to 
to einai, but in neither case would the terms have been 
suitably general. One would only have a sense of being-in­
place/way-ness, rather than being-ness (ousia). 
The semantic deficiency, however, leaves open the 
possibility that “being” is in some way conceptually implicit 
in the syntax of grammatical constructions in Nahuatl. 
Surprisingly, this is also not the case, for Nahuatl is not only 
an omnipredicative language, it is the paradigm case of a 
strongly omnipredicative language.28 
In brief, an omnipredicative language is a bundle concept
with eleven mophosyntactic features, where only one is
necessary: that the language have no copula. To explain why
Nahuatl lacks a copula verb or function, one must note first
that in an omnipredicative language, as the name suggests,
all lexical items can be used as (rhematic) predicates. As
a result, even single nouns or pronouns can serve as a
complete sentence. Yet, because nouns may function as
predicates only in the present tense, it is necessary to supply
a copular-type construction to broaden the tenses available.
But in addition to forms of câ, one may use neci (to seem),
mocuepa (to be turned into), mochihua (to become),29 
monotza (to be named), and a few other grammatical
possibilities using the determiner in and the locative ipan. 
This range of possibilities shows that there is just no single
copular verb or necessary copular construction. 
A certain amount of the remaining properties are needed 
to establish that the language is sufficiently robust to be 
classed as omnipredicative, though it is not possible to 
produce a rule which states just how many. Yet one may 
imagine a scale of strength, so that at its far end one 
could claim that a language is paradigmatically strong if it 
exhibits all ten of the “optional” morphosyntactic features 
in addition to the necessary absence of a copula. Nahuatl 
is perhaps the only language which satisfies that strong 
requirement. 
What this analysis suggests is that there is no notion in 
Nahuatl that is like “being” in the “Western” tradition of 
philosophy, whether that concept is taken to be expressed 
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either semantically or syntactically. While it is accurate, 
then, to claim that the Nahuas had an understanding of 
the basic character of reality, that they had a metaphysical 
outlook, it would be inaccurate to call it an onto-logy, where 
this term is understood etymologically to indicate the study 
of “being” (ōn). It is to spell out some of the features of this 
metaphysical but non-ontological outlook that the essay 
now turns. 
6. WHAT THERE “IS”: (OME)TEOTL 
If the Nahuas did not think of “being” as the fundamental 
principle of reality, then what did hold that position? They 
had in mind two closely related notions, teotl and ometeotl. 
To explain, the analysis develops five closely related points: 
(1) that the Nahuas took there to be one fundamental 
principle of reality; (2) that its name is (ome)teotl; (3) that 
it is fundamentally relational or “dualizing”; (4) that it is all 
of reality, entailing that the Nahuas were pantheists; and 
that (5) teotl and ometeotl are related roughly as being and 
existence were related for some “Western” philosophers.30 
Beginning with the first point, recorded texts indicate that 
all the “gods” were taken, even by many commoners, to 
be a single being.31 In the FC, for example, we read the 
following, which is said after a child had been delivered. 
The midwife addressed the goddess 
Chalchiuhtilicue, the water. She said: our lady of 
the jade skirt [Chalchiutilicue], he who shines like a 
sun of jade [Chalchiuhtlatonac]. The deserved one 
has arrived, sent here by our mother, our father, 
Dual Lord [vme-tecuhtli], Dual Lady [vme-cihuatl], 
who dwells in the middling of the nine heavens 
[chicunauh-nepan-juhca], in the place of duality 
[vme-ioca]. (FC 6, 175)32 
One perceives in this text that the same being is addressed 
as Chalchiutlique and Chalchiutlatonac, and then later as 
Ometecuhtli and Omecihuatl. This means that the single 
god, which is addressed, has a double gender. The 
singularity is underscored by the following reference to 
the place where the god dwells: the middling of the nine 
heavens, the place of duality. Despite the opinions of the 
Conquistadors, the Nahuas of the pre-conquest period did 
not believe in a pantheon of gods, but treated all as mere 
aspects of a single supreme being. There is, in short, just 
one principle of reality, just one god, who has a double 
gender, and who metaphorically “dwells” at the point where 
the nine (chicunauh-) heavens (-iuhca) middle (-nepan-). 
If the first important feature of reality for the Nahuas is 
that there is just one basic principle, then a second closely 
related point follows, namely, that this principle is best 
named (ome)teotl, by which is intended two closely related 
notions: teotl and ometeotl. As a first approximation for this 
claim, one might focus on the support for “ometeotl” as a 
basic name for the principle, leaving its relation to teotl for 
discussion with point 5 below. 
That “ometeotl” is a basic name for the fundamental 
principle of reality is already supported by the word for 
“two” or “double,” i.e., “ome,” included in all the significant 
names for the Nahua god. The passage just above, for 
example, refers to this god as Dual Lord (Ometecutli) and 
Dual Lady (Omecihuatl). The conception itself appears in 
the Historia Tolteca-Chichimeca, which a linguistic analysis 
shows to be from a period prior to the Mexica empire, likely 
from or just after the nomadic (chichimecas) period of the 
people.33 Appearing in a song of philosophical poetry, it 
reads as follows: 
Which way shall I go? Which way shall I go 
To follow the path of the god of duality [ome-teotl]? 
Perhaps your house is 
in the place of the fleshless? 
Perhaps in the interior of the heavens? 
Or is the place of the fleshless just here, on earth 
[tlalicpac]?34 
What this passage shows is that the tlamatinime seek to 
follow the path of the god of duality (ome-teotl), the single 
principle of existence. Unlike the many ome- uses one 
finds in the FC, moreover, this passage directly names 
the principle ometeotl, so that one can have confidence 
that the notion is not a philosophical reconstruction, but 
something held explicitly. 
If there is just one principle, one god (first claim), and 
its best single name is ometeotl (second claim), then a 
third claim follows closely on these: the basic principle is 
characterized by a sort of duality. The texts identified so far 
amply support this notion, with the male-female doubling 
of each name for the god, and the not infrequent use of 
ome- prefixes for these names. Yet in the passage that 
follows, from the Códice Matritense, an earlier version of 
Sahagún’s Florentine Codex, one finds further support for 
the notion that the double is the consort or inamic pair. It 
reads as follows: 
1.	 And the Toltecs knew 
2.	 that the heavens are many, 
3.	 they said that there are twelve superimposed 
divisions. 
4.	 The rooted god [nelli teotl] lives there with his 
consort [inamic]. 
5.	 The celestial god [ilhuicateotl] is called the Lord of 
Duality [ometecuhtli], 
6.	 and his consort the Lady of Duality [omecihuatl], 
the Lady of the Heavens, 
7.	 which means: 
8.	 he is king, he is lord over the twelve heavens.35 
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A few words of explanation about the broader context 
of line 4, in which the inamic appears, may facilitate 
comprehension. 
In line 1 the term “Toltec” appears. At the time of the 
conquest, the Nahuas, and especially the Mexica in 
Tenochtitlan, admired the predecessor culture they found 
when they, as a wandering group, came to settle on the 
swampy bog and found their city. They called this lofty culture 
the Toltec culture, and the term “Toltec” came to indicate 
refinement, skill, and (as noted above) a knowledge about 
crafts. The Mexica (especially) distinguished this culture 
from the culture of the wandering “Chichimechas,” a term 
roughly equivalent to the Greek “barbarian,” i.e., a people 
who spoke a different language and were considered rude, 
even though they were themselves such wanderers at one 
point.36 
With respect to lines 2-3, it is helpful to bear in mind that 
the Nahuas, like Aristotle, thought that there were multiple 
heavens, or spheres, which accounted for the movements 
of observable celestial bodies. Exactly how many heavens 
there were varies on the text consulted, ranging from nine 
to thirteen. What the Toltec wisdom conveys, then, is a 
general understanding about the structure of the heavenly 
bodies and our cosmos. 
The remaining lines make two points. The first, in lines 7-8, 
is that the one god under discussion is the basic principle 
of the cosmos, of all reality. Here that understanding is 
expressed metaphorically as the god’s rule over the twelve 
heavens. The second point, in lines 4-6, is that the one 
divine being, teotl, is identified in the singular, though it 
has a dual, reciprocal, aspect. In the singular, it is called the 
nelli teotl. The word nelli most basically means “rooted,” as 
a tree is rooted to the earth, but in its broader sense it came 
to be used as the term for “truth” and “reality.” This is the 
true god. Yet the very same line identifies this god as one 
that appears with his consort, inamic, which is why s/he 
always appears in doubles: the Lord of Duality, the Lady of 
Duality. As the context suggests, moreover, these doubles 
are related to each other in a reciprocal and complementary 
way, as are male and female, heaven and earth, day and 
night, hot and cold, life and death, cleanliness and filth, 
and so on.37 
These remarks support what is most important about 
ometeotl’s consorts. Though discussion of relations among 
pairs tends to predominate in the Nahua outlook, what 
matters is that a relationship of reciprocity is established 
among complementary aspects, so that in principle any 
number of consorts might be involved, from three (the 
underworld, the earth, and the heavens), to four (the 
number of cardinal coordinates), to nine or thirteen (the 
number of heavens). The claim that ometeotl is dualizing 
in character thus means more than that it is expressed in 
doubles. Most centrally it means that it is a principle that 
exists as a linking (coupling, or trilling, or quadrupling, et 
cetera) relation. 
These points lead naturally to the next claim, namely, 
that the Nahuas were pantheists for whom ometeotl is 
existence. This point is supported variously, though one 
finds it perhaps most clearly in the Nahua cosmological 
myths. The Historia de los Mexicanos por sus pinturas, 
which relates the character of the cosmos and the origin 
of human beings, especially as the Mexica in Tenochtitlan 
adapted the tale, runs as follows. It begins by stating that 
the Mexica had one god, Tonacatecutli~Tonacacihuatl, Lord 
and Lady of Sustenance, and that this being has always 
existed in the thirteenth heaven.38 It had no beginning, 
and was not caused or created by another. Because it is 
dualizing, an inamic/relational being, it is the source of all 
the other gods and all the five Sun-Eras of cosmic history. 
Tonacatecutli~Tonacacihuatl then “engendered four sons,” 
which are identified with the cardinal coordinates: Red 
Smoking Mirror (Tlatlauqui Tezcatlipoca), Black Smoking 
Mirror (Yayauqui Tezcatlipoca), Quetzalcoatl (Plumed 
Serpent, also called “Yohualli Ehecatl,” Wind and Night), 
and Bone Lord (Omitecutli), whom the Mexica, with their 
penchant for rewriting myths, all called Huitzliopotchli, 
their city’s specific patron deity.39 These four gods are the 
forces which activate the history of the cosmos, as they 
relate, balance, and struggle with each other. They are, 
in brief, the first expression of the dual principle. In the 
second chapter, after six hundred years, the gods come 
together to put the world in motion and, in the following 
passages especially, Quetzalcoatl must undertake a series 
of actions to restore humans to the cosmos.40 
What one witnesses in this account, then, is a sequence of 
reasoning such that the primary dual principle comes to be 
expressed progressively as more complex sets of relations, 
as four forces, as time, as cosmic Era-Suns, and eventually 
as people, who are brought into existence through the life-
force of the gods themselves. The account thus provides 
conceptually strong support for the claim that the Nahuas, 
especially their learned tlamatinime, were pantheists, for 
they held that the divine (teotl) pervades all things, is 
expressed through all of existence itself.41 
This feature of the divine also explains several points 
concerning the names given to it. Why, for example, is 
its name Smoking Mirror (Tezcatlipoca), and how is that 
name related to the title Lord of the Near and Nigh (Tloque
Nauhque), or Wind and Night (Yohualli, Ehecatl)? For 
example, in the FC we read the following address during 
the rite of confession: “And can you, using human sight, 
behold the Lord of the Near and the Nigh, the Young Man, 
the Self-Creator, Our Lord, Smoking Mirror?” (FC 6, 33).42 
How are we to understand statements like these? 
One might begin to respond with the most straightforward 
of the names: Lord of the Near and the Nigh. The name is 
straightforward because it directly suggests that Ometeotl 
is always nearby, is omnipresent, and this is true because 
Ometeotl not only pervades all things, but self-expresses 
as all things. The next conceptual name, Wind and Night, 
evokes cases where our human vision functions poorly 
or fails altogether. It is hard to see the wind, because we 
only see what the wind moves, and it is hard to see during 
night, precisely because we have only outlines of those 
objects. The core idea at work in the name Wind~Night, 
then, is that Ometeotl is imperceptible, or at least not 
directly perceptible, since Ometeotl is everything. Stated 
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differently, Ometeotl is not a single object which might be 
the focal point of perception, and it is this imperceptibility 
which explains why the passage begins by asking whether 
human sight (tic-tlacat(l)-itta) will be sufficient to perceive 
the single and same being given all the following names. 
Turning to the last, and most puzzling names, Tezcatlipoca, 
the foregoing provides some context. Standardly translated 
as Smoking Mirror, the grammatically central and the 
uncontested portion of the name is tezcatl, mirror.43 In 
Nahua literature a mirror is used as a metaphor for an 
object that illuminates an area. Yet the context here is 
cosmological, rather than local, so the suggestion is that 
Ometeotl is a source of light, the mirror, the sun, which 
is clouded, smoked, at night. This would be consistent, of 
course, with the panentheistic outlook of the tlamatinime, 
for whom Ometeotl is imperceptibly everywhere, and so is 
the cosmos and its heavenly motions.44 
The Legend of The Suns, recorded in the Codex 
Chimalpopoca, provides important details about the 
character of cosmogenesis as the Nahuas understood it, 
but it also introduces an important philosophical distinction 
for the fundamental character of reality, namely, the 
difference between existence (Ometeotl), and “being” or 
“reality” (teotl), which is the fifth claim for this section. 
The recorded text is a transcription in Nahuatl which relays 
the information that an indigenous tlamatini (philosopher) 
read to a scribe from an ideographic pre-Cortesian amoxtli
(painting-book). He begins by pointing out the origin of 
the story: “Here is the wisdom-fable-discourse, how it 
transpired long ago that the earth was established, how 
each thing found its place. This is how it is known in what 
way all the suns began.”45 The discourse records the first 
four suns as a complete unit, then interjects two tales, one 
about maize corn and another about Quetzalcoatl’s journey 
to bring humans back to life on earth, and then relates the 
story of the fifth sun, in which we are presently supposed 
to live. 
The stories of the five suns often strike the modern reader 
as mythical curiosities, though it should be noted that the 
sense that humans had been created and destroyed, or 
lived and perished, multiple times was broadly shared in 
Mesoamerican culture.46 Briefly, the story goes as follows 
(formatted for clarity). 
With the first sun, named 4 Jaguar, the humans 
who lived survived 676 years, but were eventually 
devoured by Jaguars and so destroyed totally. 
During the period of this sun, the text tells us that 
the people ate “7 straw [chicome malinalli],” which 
would have been the calendrical name of a sacred 
food, such as corn or squash, but we are uncertain 
which exactly. (CC, slide 75.7) 
Under the second sun, named 4 Wind, humans 
were blown away and became monkeys, though 
not totally destroyed. What they ate was 12 snake. 
In the third sun, named 4 Rain, humans were 
rained on by fire, and turned into birds. Their food 
was 7 Flint. 
In the fourth sun, named 4 Water, humans who ate 
4 flower were inundated in a flood and became 
fish. 
It is at this point that the two additional fables 
about maize and Quetzalcoatl are related, and 
then the story of the fifth sun, 4 Motion, is relayed. 
For its creation Nanahuatl throws himself into a 
fire, and his consort Nahuitecpatl threw herself 
into the ashes. Yet, because Nanahuatl would not 
move, the other gods living in the paradise garden 
Tamoanchan sacrificed themselves so that he 
would continue in his orbit. 
This is our age, and though it is not stated in the text now 
entitled Legends of the Sun, in a companion text, Annales 
de Cuauhtitlan, the retelling of the five suns relates the 
following: 
This fifth sun, 4 Movement [ollin] is its day sign, is 
called Movement Sun [olintonati], because it moves 
along and follows its course. And what the old 
ones say is that under it there will be earthquakes 
and famine, and so we will be destroyed. (CC, slide 
2.42) 
As with the previous suns, ours too will come to an 
end, and as was the case with those suns, it is the basic 
character of the cosmic organization, jaguars, rain, and so 
on, that spells the end of the living people. Since our sun 
is a sun of movement, specifically ollin movement, which 
is associated with undulating or wave-like motion, our end 
will be through earthquakes with famine. 
What matters about the Legend of the Suns for philosophical 
purposes is that it can explain the relationship between 
teotl and ometeotl. For it makes clear that what happens to 
exist now is an expression of a specific configuration of the 
divine, i.e., teotl. Each sun is a special configuration of the 
teotl in a cosmic order, complete with the sorts of food that 
are appropriate to the kind of being which lives in that order. 
Teotl is thus expressed qua sun as ometeotl. Yet ometeotl
exists only qua a specific sun, such as 4 Movement, which 
happens to be our specific cosmic configuration. 
To contextualize the matter more broadly in Nahua thought, 
one might put it as follows. Though the Nahuas occasionally 
spoke of teotl simply as what there is, in general they spoke 
and wrote of it as teotl under some aspect, as a specific 
god such as Tezcatlipoca, or by a specific characteristic, 
as the Wind and Night, or most generally as ometeotl. 
Yet what the legend of the suns shows is that any of the 
specific configurations we witness, the way in which teotl
takes concrete form through doubling, through balancing 
or rooting consorts, could have been otherwise. In fact, it 
was otherwise at some point, and will be again later. This is 
why Nezahualcoyotl claims that we live fundamentally “in 
a house of paintings,” in the painting book of the divine, 
wherein the slightest brush movement may blot us out 
(RS, fol. 35r). “The earth,” that is, the place where humans 
live, “is slippery, slick” as a famous Nahua saying goes (FC
6, 228).47 But the cosmos itself, and not only our human 
condition, is fragile in its balance and ephemeral at its core. 
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This is why, if 4 Movement is our cosmic order, ometeotl
may be thought of as “existence,” and teotl, the reality of 
all possible cosmic expressions, as “being.” 
7. DIVINITY: OUSIA AKINĒTOS AND TEOTL 
Before concluding, the argument considers what would 
appear to be an important difference in the accounts of 
reality as one finds it in Aristotle and the Nahuas. Aristotle’s 
presentation in the central books of the Metaphysics, 
books IV through IX, roughly, appear to proceed by way of 
a naturalist directive, i.e., they do not require any specific 
sort of religious commitment, while the Nahuas’ directive, 
at first blush, appears to be fully theological. (Ome)teotl
may be taken as the basic character of reality, but it never 
loses its connection with divinity. The foregoing argument 
does provide grounds to understand teotl as “the way 
things are through their changes,” but it does not suggest 
that the term, which is most often translated as “god,” is 
unconnected to divinity in the Nahuatl mind. Two points 
should be noted in response. 
A first is that certain authors, Nezahualcoyotl, for example, 
do question the existence of the divine and the specifics of 
religious belief. In a philosophic poem entitled “I Am Sad,” 
he writes: 
I am sad, I grieve 
I, lord Nezahualcoyotl. 
With flowers and with songs 
I remember the princes, 
Those who went away, 
Tezozomoctzin, and that one Cuacuahtzin. 
Do they truly live, 
There Where-in-Someway-One-Exists?48 
Nezahualcoyotl is in these lines clearly expressing doubt 
about life in a place after death. Must it be a place where one 
in some, non-fleshy way exists? This doubt in the afterlife, 
further, explains Nezahualcoyotl’s ongoing preoccupation 
with death, since he is little comforted by the ordinary 
stories. Yet, beyond this and similar instances of doubt, it is 
important to recognize that the Nahua conception of teotl
is hardly a personal god. Teotl is rather more like a universal 
energy which is formed into our specific cosmos for a 
time. As pantheists, their conception of teotl was closer 
to the Buddhist Nirvana or Benedict Spinoza’s substance 
than the personalist conceptions of the divine that often 
trouble those who would like philosophy to be strictly 
naturalist. Taken together, these remarks suggest that the 
Nahua tlamatinime did not think of a personal god as the 
fundamental source of reality, but rather argued for a view 
of the world that recognized a divinity to be present in all 
features of the natural world. 
A second response is that the matter is not so straightforward 
in Aristotle either. One may think of the project of the 
Metaphysics to be completed in either of two ways. One 
way is as a general theory of substance, one that articulates 
how substance satisfies the requirements for a science of 
being qua being, and just in what the characteristics of that 
substance consist. Another way is to consider substance’s 
most exemplary case, the first mover or uncaused cause. In 
the opening chapter of book VI of the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
suggests that the latter is closer to his understanding. He 
writes: 
if there is no substance other than those which are 
formed by nature, natural science [physikē] will 
be the first science; but if there is an immovable 
substance [ousia akinētos], the science of this 
must be prior and must be first philosophy, and 
universal in this way, because it is first. And it will 
belong to this [discipline] to consider [theōrēsai] 
being qua being—both what it is [ti esti] and the 
attributes which belong to it qua being. (Met. VI.1, 
1026a27-32) 
Aristotle not only states that the study of this immovable 
substance is best named first philosophy, its consideration 
uses the Greek word theōrēsai, which is composed of the 
terms theos, divinity, and horaō, to see. It would be too 
much, in general, to take the etymological origin of the 
word as its meaning, namely, “to see the divine,” but in 
this case, Aristotle is explicitly supporting just this outlook. 
What, then, is one to make of Aristotle’s approach in the 
Metaphysics? Some have suggested that this is but a 
holdover from Aristotle’s earlier Platonic education in the 
Academy.49 Others have argued that we should rather 
excise the offending passage from our interpretation of 
the Metaphysics so that Aristotle completes a naturalist 
account of substance in book IX, and in XII undertakes a 
special investigation into a substance which is divine and 
with a mind. 
Yet the most natural reading would be to take Aristotle 
at his word: he understands the arguments of book XII, 
which investigation he also explicitly calls theology, first 
philosophy par excellence. The idea would appear to be 
that the first mover is a model of substance, and in that 
way an answer to the general question of being qua
being.50 This would make Aristotle’s outlook generally 
consistent with his arguments in the NE that theoretical 
contemplation is the only way that we humans can act as 
immortalizing beings, and that this is one of the reasons 
why the contemplative life is the best and accompanied by 
the best pleasure (hēdonē).51 
What these points suggest is that there is likely not so great 
a distance between Aristotle and the Nahuas in taking the 
basic character of reality to be divine. Similarly, neither 
view is committed to understanding the divinity of reality 
to be of the sort that is guaranteed by a personal and 
soteriological god. 
8. CONCLUSION: WISDOM AND METAPHYSICS 
The basic question of “Western” metaphysics cannot be 
put into words in Nahuatl, whether three or more, because 
the language has no concept of “being,” understood 
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either semantically or syntactically. Yet the pre-Columbian 
tlamatinime (philosophers) did ask about the fundamental 
character of reality. Like Aristotle who called this knowledge 
sophia, “wisdom,” the Nahuas called it tlamatiliztli, which is 
also best translated as “wisdom.” For Aristotle, however, 
sophia consists in grasping the first principle of the science 
(epistēmē) of being qua being, which he argued was 
identified when one understood just in what substance 
(ousia) consists. For the Nahuas tlamatiliztli consists in 
understanding the way things are through their changes, 
teotl, and giving it the most adequate expression one can, 
namely, in poetry. The reasons for this conclusion are two: 
first, one can neither grasp teotl directly, She~He is the 
Wind and Night, and, second, teotl is nothing but the ways 
of cosmic (punctuated) radical transformation. Finally, for 
Aristotle, any account of the substance of an entity ought 
to explain why it is a basic subject, and why it is an essence 
(to ti esti). For the Aztecs, teotl is doubly expressed, as 
some cosmos generally, as ometeotl, and as a cosmos 
specifically, for example, ours, which is 4 Movement— 
these are, if not the criteria, then at least the character of 
teotl’s intelligibility. 
The present essay thus bears several fruits for scholarship. 
It is not only the first to undertake the comparative task 
in thinking through the relations among Aristotle’s 
ontological project and the Nahuas’ metaphysical outlook, 
it is the first to look seriously at the epistemic terms used 
and the specific epistemic claims each project implies. 
Aristotle is traditionally taken to hold a metaphysically 
realist view, since for him we can both know what there 
is, perhaps by induction (epiagogē) or intuition (nous), 
and what there is, ousia, is intelligible and eternal. The 
Nahuas, by contrast, were quasi-realists. They did not deny 
that we could know, in some sense (as mati), the cosmic 
order in which we live, but they did deny that this cosmic 
order was the basic character of reality itself. That reality, 
the nelli teotl (true/rooted being), is only ever expressed 
as a cosmic order, ometeotl, which undergoes radical, 
punctuated transformations. Wisdom (tlamatiliztli) thus 
consists in grasping the limits of our knowledge (mati), in 
understanding the evanescence of the cosmic order itself. 
A final and important fruit concerns the adequacy of these 
outlooks. The philosophic task for historical works shares 
something in common with anthropology and history, 
namely, that it aims to describe accurately the notions 
and basic frameworks which were held by historical 
persons or traditions. Unlike these other disciplines, 
however, philosophy also aims to evaluate the character 
of the frameworks under discussion for their reasonability. 
As Socrates might have asked: Are they true? The topics 
of the present essay are difficult to answer generally, 
and especially so in the space of a single essay. What it 
is hoped is that the foregoing provides the grounds for 
concluding that while quite different from Aristotle’s 
substance ontological, the Nahua’s process metaphysics is 
at least prima facie reasonable when considered alongside 
his. Moreover, it approaches the fundamental question 
of metaphysics in a way that does without the two basic 
criteria which Aristotle thinks any good answer should 
meet, namely, that the account address basic subjects and 
essences. If the Nahua approach is the correct one, then it 
would appear that not only is Aristotle’s approach likely to 
be inaccurate, but much of the “Western” tradition, which 
follows him to some degree, is as well. Whether the Nahua 
account holds up under further scrutiny may form a task for 
future research. 
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NOTES 
1.	 Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), book IV.1, 1003a20-1. To be abbreviated 
Met. hereafter. When not using the English translation, or when 
modifying it, I have used Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. W. Jaeger 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1957) for the Greek source. 
2.	 Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine 
Logico-Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 1. 
3.	 The same point holds for Martin Heidegger as well, but his case 
is different insofar as he sought not so much to engage in the 
tradition of “Western” metaphysics as to dig beneath it. This is just 
the point that he makes in the “Introduction” to Gesamtausgabe, 
Band 2, Sein und Zeit (Tübigen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), 
available in English as Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). In light of Heidegger’s aim, one 
might wonder whether a better way to his goal might not have 
been simply to undertake work in comparative philosophy. 
4.	 I of course have in mind Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and 
Reality, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: 
The Free Press, 1978), and Gilles Deleuze’s work in Différence et 
répétition (Paris: Épiméthée Press, 2013), available in English as 
Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), and Logique de Sens (Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit, 1982), available in English as The Logic of Sense, trans. 
Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990). 
5.	 See, for example, James Maffie, Aztec Philosophy: Understanding 
a World in Motion (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2014), 
23. I do not, of course, disagree with Maffie. The purpose of the 
present essay is to clarify just what is intended by a “process” 
metaphysics when faced with an articulate account which would 
appear to take the substance of an entity to be just that, a 
process, energeia. 
6.	 I mean only to support the tradition notion here, to write for a 
moment as the schoolmen did, that the essence (to ti esti) of an 
entity is its first actuality. 
7.	 The views on this topic are vast, but two that are of interest 
are those who develop some form of the answer that forms 
are particulars, including Wilfred Sellars, “Substance and Form 
in Aristotle,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 54 (1957): 688–99, and 
Charlotte Witt, “Aristotelian Essentialism Revisited,” The Journal 
of the History of Philosophy, vol. 27 (1989): 285–98, and others 
who maintain that only some universals are not substances 
(rather than no . . . are), including G. E. L. Owen, “Particular and 
General,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1978): 
1–21, and Michael J. Loux, Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Z and H (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991). 
8.	 Translation is my own. 
9.	 The connection with sight and knowing in this passage is much
closer in the Greek, since the word Aristotle here uses is “eidenai,”
which is related to the word “idea,” literally, the look of things. 
10. Aristotle here references his discussion of science and art 
in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachae, ed. I. Bywater (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), book VI.3, 1139b22-23, and so 
the present development takes these points from that work to 
complete the argument. Hereafter abbreviated as NE. 
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11. Translation is my own. 
12. Translation is my own. 
13.	 The present study uses Bernadino de Sahagún, Florentine 
Codex: A General History of the Things of New Spain, vols. 1-12, 
ed. and trans. by Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble 
(Santa Fe: The University of Utah Press, 1953–1981), hereafter 
abbreviated FC. For an example of “mati” in its use as knowledge 
by acquaintance, see the description of the old merchants who 
have already visited other places “in inpilhoan in ie onmatia 
veca” (FC 4, 65). 
14. Although it is possible that a toltecatl could have been female, 
this would not in general have been the case among the Nahuas, 
as women who were trained in practical affairs would have 
learned different skills such as weaving. The Nahua educational 
system was more gender equal with schooling for the arts used 
in governing, literature, philosophy, history, law, astronomy, and 
religion. I have thus used the male pronoun, since this is a more 
accurate gender representation of the Nahua culture. 
15.	 Or perhaps they might, but it would be incidental to their role as 
a tlamatini. 
16. Translation is my own. 
17.	 Recall that “mach-” is the base 4 stem of mati used in passive 
constructions so that the word for counselor te-ix-tla-mach-tia-ni
is a compound term indicating that the agent (ni) causes (tia) 
another (te) to gain experience (ix and mach) about things (tla). It 
is thus the same sort of knowledge as experience (or prudence) 
that ix-tla-mati-liztli means, namely, connected experience (ix 
and mati) about things (tla) -ness (liztli). 
18. This phrase, the way things are through their changes, is my best 
translation of “teotl.” 
19.	 Ballads of the Lords of New Spain: The Codex Romances de 
los señores de la nueva españa, transcribed by John Bierhorst 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), fol. 19v-20r. Hereafter 
abbreviated as RS. 
20. The topic of truth and knowledge is a difficult one in Nahua 
thought, and it is not directly the focus of the present essay. 
The following may suffice for the present. The present account 
is likely closest to Miguel León-Portilla’s in the first and third 
chapters of La filosofía nahuatl: Estudiada en sus fuentes, 
seventh edition (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma 
de México, 1993), originally published in 1956. He argues there 
that poetry is this highest form of knowledge and truth available. 
What the present account adds is that this is the case because 
of a metaphysical conception of the universe, and not our 
epistemic access to this reality. This approach stands at some 
distance from two further accounts. A first is Willard Gingerich 
in “Heidegger and the Aztecs: The Poetics of Knowing in Pre-
Hispanic Poetry,” in Recovering the World: Essays on Native 
American Literature, ed. Brian Swann and Arnold Kruptat (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 85–112, argues 
that the Nahuas had an understanding of truth and knowledge 
that was close to Martin Heidegger’s sense of alētheia, as he 
develops that notion in some of his later writing, such as “Vom 
Wesen des Grundes,” in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, Band 
2 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 73–108. A second 
approach is James Maffie’s in “Double Mistaken Philosophical 
Identity in Sahagún’s ‘Colloquios y Doctrina Cristiana,’” Divinatio
34 (Autumn-Winter 2011): 63–92, argues that the Nahuas had a 
path-seeking understanding of truth and knowledge, rather than 
a (traditionally “Western”) truth-seeking understanding. 
21. Translation is my own. 
22. Translation modified. 
23.	 There is, additionally, the thornier problem concerning the 
methodological status of the Metaphysics: Is it dialectical, or is 
it somehow the demonstrative science Aristotle develops in the 
Organon, or perhaps neither? Perhaps, as Terence Irwin suggests 
in Aristotle’s First Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), Aristotle is using a sort of “strong” dialectic here. Or 
perhaps the character of demonstrative science in the Organon, 
as it is generally understood, is not accurate, as Patrick Byrne 
suggests in Analysis and Science in Aristotle (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1997). There is also the possibility that Aristotle modified 
his position, and that the best resources for his methods may 
be found in his biological works. This is a view that Gorgios 
Anagnostopoulos supports in “Aristotle’s Methods,” in A 
Companion to Aristotle, ed. Gorgios Anagnostopoulos (Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2013). For the present work, I set 
this problem aside as either solution would suffice, though I note 
that some such position is necessary for Aristotle’s argument 
here. 
24. Translation modified. 
25. Translation modified. 
26. That Aristotle’s argument in the Metaphysics turns on showing 
that the desired science of being qua being study a matter which 
specifies both a basic subject and an essence is uncontroversial. 
Aryeh Kosman, for example, in The Activity of Being: An Essay 
on Aristotle’s Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013), 23, notes that the whole argument of the metaphysics 
follows these two criteria into Aristotle’s discussion of subject 
and predicate, form and matter, and so on. What the present 
account does suggest is that Aristotle establishes these criteria 
much earlier than is typically identified, neither in book seven, 
as is often argued, or (even) in book five, as Kosman holds. The 
result supports the contention that the main chapters of the 
Metaphysics be read as a single, coherent argument. 
27.	 Translation modified. 
28. Michel 	Launey is the first to have coined the term 
“omnipredicative” to characterize the specific features of 
Nahuatl grammar in his Une grammaire omniprédicative: Essai 
sur la morphosyntaxe du nahuatl classique (Paris: CNRS Press, 
1994), but similar insights were made by others at about the 
same time, for example, J. Richard Andrews in the first edition 
of his Introduction to Classical Nahuatl (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1975). Launey’s first grammar book 
appeared in 1979 in French as Introduction à la langue et à la 
littérature aztèques, vol. 1: Grammaire (Paris: L’Harmattan). For 
a development of the grammatical scholarship on Nahuatl, see 
James Lockhart’s “Editorial Preface” to the bilingual edition 
of Horacio Carcochi’s Grammar of the Mexican Language With 
an Explanations of Its Adverbs (1645), ed. and trans. by James 
Lockhart (Stanford: Stanford University Press (2001), vii–xxii. The 
primary and most updated account of omnipredicativity, which 
the present essay uses, is Launey’s explanation in “The Features 
of Omnipredicativity in Classical Nahuatl,” Sprachtypologie und 
Universalienforschung 57 (2004): 49–69. 
29.	 The root of this word, chihua, means “to act” or “to do,” and has 
a reflexive prefix mo- added. It is not, then, related to the system 
of verbs deriving from câ. Any connection between being and 
becoming, conceptually and linguistically present in English, is 
thus artificial, resulting from translation of Nahuatl into English. 
30. The analogy is not exact, but I have in mind Thomas Aquinas 
in De ente et essentia in English translation as Thomas Aquinas 
on Being and Essence, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968). 
31.	 This is against Jacques Soustelle’s claim, which he develops in 
chapter seven of La vie quotidienne des aztèques à la vielle de 
la conquête espagnole (Paris: Hachette, 1955), that this sort of 
knowledge was confined to an elite or at least selective class of 
individuals in Nahua culture. 
32. The translation is my own. The reader should recall that “o” is 
often recorded as “u,” and “u” is sometimes recorded as “v,” so 
that “vme” is here a transcription for “ome,” meaning “two” or 
“dual.” 
33.	 Angel Garibay, Historia de la literatura náhuatl, vol. 1 (Mexico 
City: Porrúa Press, 1953), 128–30. Alfonso Caso makes a case for 
this in his La Religión de los Aztecas (Mexico City: Enciclopedia 
Ilustrada Mexicana, 1936), 8. 
34.	 Historia-Tolteca Chichimeca, ed. and trans. by Luis Reyes García, 
Paul Kirchoff and Lina Odena Güemes (Puebla: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1976), 166. I have followed Miguel León-Portilla’s 
Spanish in La filosofía Nahuatl, 149. 
35.	 Códice Matritense de la Real Academia, VIII, fol. 175v, which 
is available online http://bdmx.mx/documento/bernardino­
sahagun-codices-matritenses. Last accessed June 20, 2018. 
The present translation follows Miguel León-Portilla’s Spanish 
translation in La filosofía nahuatl, 151. 
36. See especially chapters three and seven of Soustelle’s 	La vie 
quotidienne des aztèques à la vielle de la conquête espagnole
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for a more careful analysis of the relationship of the Mexica to 
their predecessor cultures, and the Toltecs and Chichimecas in 
particular. 
37.	 For further development, see Alfredo López Austin, Cuerpo 
humano e ideología: Las concepciones de los antiguos Nahuas, 
vol. I (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de México, 1984), 55– 
68. 
38.	 Historia de los Mexicanos por sus pinturas, originally published 
by Joaquín García Icazbalceta in Teogonía e Historia de los 
Mexicanos: Tres Opúsculos del Siglo XIV, ed. Ángel Garibay, 
(Mexico City: Porrúa Press, 1965), 23. 
39.	 Ibid. 
40. Ibid., 25. 
41.	 This line of argument stretches back at least to Hermann 
Bayer’s “Das aztekishe Götterbild Alexander von Humbolt,” in 
Wissenschaftliche Festschrift zu Enthüllung des von Seiten S. 
M. Kaiser Wilhelm II, dem Mexicanischen Volke zum Jubiläum, 
seiner Unabhängigkeit Gestiften Humboldt-Denkmals… (Mexico 
City, Müller hons., 1910), 116. It is a line of argument of course 
continued in Soustille’s La vie quotidienne des aztèques, Miguel 
León-Portilla, even in his more recent Aztecas-Mexicas: Desarrollo 
de una civilización originaria (Mexico City: Algaba Press, 2005), 
and also James Maffie’s Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a 
World in Motion. 
42. Translation is my own. 
43.	 This translation of Tezcatlipoca is a contentious one. Frances 
Karttunen, in the entry to the name in her An Analytical Dictionary 
of Nahuatl (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), notes 
that although the stem poc, from poch-tli for “smoke” exists, 
there is no corresponding verb poca. It might rather be related to 
the word ihpotza, which would have the intransitive verb ihpoca, 
meaning to belch, or perhaps even give forth smoke. What is 
critical for the present analysis, however, is the uncontested 
term tezcatl, mirror, which is amply attested as metaphor for an 
object which lights up another. 
44. This analysis follows, 	grosso modo, the analysis León-Portilla 
provides in chapter three of La Filosofía Nahuatl. 
45.	 Codex Chimalpopoca: The Text in Nahuatl with a Glossary and 
Grammatical Notes, ed. John Bierhorst (Tuscon: University 
of Arizona Press, 1992), 87. Hereafter abbreviated as CC. All 
translations of this text are my own, though in this case, because 
it accepts Bierhorst’s corrections, the resulting translation is 
close. 
46. See, for example, the stories of the four creations of humans in 
parts one and three of the Popul Vuh, Dennis Tedlock (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
47.	 Translation is my own. 
48.	 Cantares Mexicanos, fols. 25r and v. Translation is slightly 
modified for readability from Miguel León-Portilla’s in Fifteen 
Poets of the Aztec World, 93. 
49.	 This is especially Werner Jaeger’s view as expressed in Aristoteles: 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, 
Weidmann, 1923), English translation by Richard Robinson, 
Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1934). 
50. This is the view developed in different ways by Günther Patzig in 
“Theologie und Ontologie in der ‘Metaphysik’ des Aristoteles,” 
Kantstudien 52 (1960–1961): 185ff; reprinted in Articles on 
Aristotle: 3 Metaphysics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. 
Sorabji (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 33ff, and chapter 
seven of Kosman’s The Activity of Being. The unified view likely 
finds its earliest source, among “Western” commentators, in 
Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. 
John Rowan (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1961). 
51.	 This is the view of Aristotle’s contemplative life that C. D. C. Reeve 
develops in chapter six of Action, Contemplation, and Happiness
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
Dance as Native Performative Knowledge 
Shay Welch 
SPELMAN COLLEGE
Over the past few decades, there has been an upsurge in
Native American performance arts to revisit and remember— 
to tell through retelling—stories of the past and how they
have shaped Native identities and knowledges as those
stories, identities, and knowledges have struggled to
survive continued expropriation, abuse, and erasure. Native
dance, specifically, has experienced a revitalization through
a number of Native artists’ endeavors to interweave the
traditional with the contemporary. Native performance arts
companies such as Native American Theatre Ensemble,
DAYSTAR, Institute of American Indian Arts, Dancing Earth
Contemporary Indigenous Dance Creations, Oxlaval Q’anil,
Native Earth Performing Arts, Turtle Gals Performance
Ensemble, Spiderwoman Theater, and Red Arts Performing
Arts Company have utilized embodiment and motion as a way
of accessing and extracting blood memory to communicate
such knowledges to Native and non-Native audiences. In the
Foreward of Native American Dance: Ceremonies and Social
Traditions, Richard West explains that 
Dance is the very embodiment of Indigenous values 
and represents the response of Native Americans 
to complex and sometimes difficult historical 
experiences. Music and dance combine with 
material culture, language, spirituality, and artistic 
expression in compelling and complex ways, and 
are definitive elements of Native identity.1 
Beyond the articulation of identity, dance within the Native 
American worldview is deeply entrenched in and as ways 
of knowing. Charlotte Heth explains: “Indeed, in Indian life, 
the dance is not possible without the belief systems and 
the music, and the belief systems and the music can hardly 
exist without the dance.”2 
In 1921 the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs issued 
the following Circular decree: 
I have, therefore, to direct you to use your 
utmost endeavours to dissuade the Indians from 
excessive indulgence in the practice of dancing. 
You should suppress any dances which cause 
waste of time, interfere with the occupations of the 
Indians, unsettle them for serious work, injure their 
health or encourage them in sloth and idleness. 
You should also dissuade, and, if possible, prevent 
them from leaving their reserves for the purpose 
of attending fairs, exhibitions, etc., when their 
absence would result in their own farming and 
other interests being neglected. It is realized that 
reasonable amusement and recreation should 
be enjoyed by Indians, but they should not be 
allowed to dissipate their energies and abandon 
themselves to demoralizing amusements. By the 
use of tact and firmness you can obtain control and 
keep it, and this obstacle to continued progress 
will then disappear.3 
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